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Cummings v. Barber, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 18 (April 2, 2020)1
RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND FAILURE TO REMOVE FROM PATIENT’S BODY FOREIGN
OBJECTS LEFT BEHIND DURING PRIOR SURGERY
Summary
In an opinion drafted by Justice Cadish, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether a
res ipsa loquitur statute, NRS 41A.100(1)(a), applies where a surgeon fails to remove a foreign
object that was implanted and left inside a patient’s body during a previous surgery.2 The Court
concluded that the statute can apply in cases where the sole purpose of the surgery at-issue is to
remove medical devices and hardware implanted during a previous surgery.
Background
This case arose out of a medical malpractice allegation against Dr. Annabel E. Barber, who
did not remove surgical clips and wire fragments from the body of the plaintiff patient, Melissa
Cummings, in 2014 during surgery. Cummings sued the doctor and the hospital, University
Medical Center (UMC), for medical malpractice, alleging that they breached their professional
standard of care. When Cummings filed her complaint, she did not attach a medical expert affidavit
because she relied on NRS 41A.100(1)(a), which does not require medical expert testimony
because of the “rebuttable presumption that the personal injury or death was caused by negligence
. . . where evidence is presented that . . . [a] foreign substance . . . was unintentionally left within
the body of a patient following surgery.”3
Dr. Barber provided an expert report along with her answer. The expert explained that the
objects left in Cummings’ stomach were not surgical clips, but were actually wire fragments, and
the expert said leaving them in Cummings’ body was not negligent. Cummings did not retain an
expert to counter Dr. Barber’s expert’s testimony, and Dr. Barber and UMC moved for summary
judgment. Dr. Barber contended that she intentionally left the material in Cummings’ body because
removal would have been too risky. Dr. Barber argued that Cummings could not establish the facts
giving rise to NRS 41A.100(1)’s presumption of negligence and thus needed to provide expert
testimony.4
The district court granted summary judgment in Dr. Barber and UMC’s favor. The district
court concluded that NRS 41A.100(1) did not apply as a matter of law, because the surgeon failed
to remove an object that had been left in the patient’s body during a previous surgery.5 The district
court concluded that Cummings needed to present an expert’s testimony to establish negligence.
Because the district court concluded that NRS 41A.100(1) did not apply as a matter of law, the
district court did not address whether Dr. Barber’s failure to remove the objects was intentional. 6
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Discussion
Statutory interpretation
Most cases involving foreign objects left in a patient’s body arise when a patient discovers
that an object was left in his or her body during the present surgery, not a previous one. Here, the
objects left in Cummings’ body during the second surgery were initially inserted into her body
during her first surgery, making the case different than most that would typically implicate NRS
41A.100(1).7 Because of this distinction, the Court had to engage in statutory interpretation to
determine whether NRS 41A.100(1) applies in cases when the foreign object was left in the
patient’s body during one surgery and then subsequently not removed during a second surgery.8
The Court first looked at the plain meaning of the statute.9 The Court discussed the
Legislature’s intent behind the statute, which was to relieve plaintiffs of the burden and expense
of retaining expert witnesses when negligence can be shown through common sense (res ipsa
loquitur).10 Based on the plain meaning and legislative intent of the statute, the Court concluded
that the district court interpreted the statute too narrowly, excluding surgeries where foreign
objects were left in the patient’s body after having been inserted during a previous surgery. The
Court particularly emphasized that the district court’s interpretation would preclude the application
of NRS 41A.100(1) in cases like Cummings’, where the entire purpose of the second surgery is to
remove hardware that had been inserted during the first surgery.11
The Court declined to adopt the broad interpretation that Cummings advocated. Cummings
urged the Court to interpret NRS 41A.100(1) to include any prior surgery, even when the purpose
of the later surgery was not to remove a previously implanted device. 12 The Court concluded that
this interpretation would lead to an absurd result, because it could open medical professionals to
liability for surgeries that occurred long ago by other surgeons in unrelated circumstances. Thus,
the Court declined to hold that a surgeon has an affirmative duty to discover foreign objects left
behind by different surgeons in unrelated surgeries. The Court concluded that a jury could, based
on common knowledge alone, find that Dr. Barber’s failure to remove the hardware constituted
negligence under NRS 41A.100(1).13
Summary judgment
The Court next addressed whether Cummings presented sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment. The Court concluded that Dr. Barber did not conclusively negate the statutory
presumption of negligence or show a lack of evidence for the presumption to apply.14 The Court
also concluded that Cummings was not required to provide expert testimony to survive summary
judgment. The Court recently concluded that such evidence is not required at trial, so it would be
unreasonable for it to be required at the summary judgment stage.15
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Conclusion
The Court concluded that under NRS 41A.100(1), plaintiffs are not required to present
expert testimony in cases where objects were left in a plaintiff’s body during one surgery and were
subsequently not removed during a related surgery.16 The Court reversed the district court,
concluding that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of negligence, and remanded
for further proceedings.
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